Russia moves to ‘real war’ with mobilization, escalation after Duma elections
Russia appears to be laying the political and military groundwork for a significant escalation of its war against Ukraine after September’s State Duma elections, according to a new analysis by the Jamestown Foundation.

Ukrainian forces continue striking deep inside Russian territory and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned during a national address Saturday that Moscow is preparing for a mass mobilization of troops.
Zelenskyy also claimed Russia is preparing to bring in another 30,000 North Korean troops soon.
The developments come amid one of Ukraine’s most sustained long-range strike campaigns of the war.
Ukrainian drones and missiles have continued to hit targets deep inside Russia, including oil refineries, military logistics facilities, and infrastructure around Moscow, demonstrating Kyiv’s growing ability to project power far beyond the front lines.
Against that backdrop, Kremlin rhetoric has shifted markedly.
The Jamestown Foundation, a Washington-based think tank specializing in Eurasian security, says Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov’s recent declaration that Russia’s “special military operation” has become “a real war” represents a significant departure from years of carefully controlled messaging.
Since the invasion began in 2022, Moscow had consistently insisted it was conducting only a “special military operation.”
According to Jamestown, Peskov’s comments may be intended to prepare the Russian public for a broader mobilization and a longer, more intensive conflict rather than negotiations.
The report identifies four major indicators that suggest the Kremlin is preparing for escalation.
First, sources reportedly close to President Vladimir Putin claim he has “resolved to escalate” the conflict rather than seek compromise, reinforcing earlier warnings from Western intelligence officials that Putin’s ambitions extend well beyond Ukraine.
Second, growing speculation inside Russia suggests Putin could announce a nationwide mobilization shortly after September’s Duma elections.
Jamestown argues that while elections do not determine Putin’s hold on power, they provide political cover by demonstrating elite and public acceptance before potentially unpopular military measures are announced.
The report suggests Peskov’s comments may have served as a trial balloon to gauge public reaction.
Third, Russian lawmakers have introduced legislation requiring exit visas for citizens traveling abroad.
Although initially aimed at travel to so-called “unfriendly countries,” analysts say the measure could prevent military-age men from fleeing Russia if another draft is announced, similar to the exodus that followed the partial mobilization of 2022.
Fourth, Moscow continues rapidly expanding its nationwide Cossack mobilization network.
Jamestown reports that the Kremlin is building reserve formations expected eventually to total roughly 60,000 personnel, while also creating specialized drone units, conducting reserve exercises, and strengthening volunteer battalions already fighting in Ukraine.
The warnings coincide with new concerns about growing North Korean involvement in the conflict.
Speaking Saturday, Zelenskyy said Russian preparations have been underway since June to receive an additional 30,000 North Korean troops in Russia’s Voronezh region.
Moscow and Pyongyang signed a mutual defense agreement in 2024, and North Korea has already deployed approximately 12,000 to 15,000 personnel in support of Russian operations.
“Russia wants to receive another 30,000 troops from North Korea,” Zelenskyy said, warning that the cooperation is allowing North Korea to gain valuable battlefield experience while improving its weapons systems.
According to Politico, the additional deployment would dramatically expand North Korea’s direct participation in Europe’s largest land war since World War II.
Zelenskyy also warned that Russian battlefield losses continue to outpace recruitment.
He said Russia has recruited approximately 221,000 soldiers during 2026 while suffering roughly 225,500 casualties, including an estimated 131,000 killed.
Despite those losses, Ukrainian intelligence believes the Kremlin is preparing another mobilization wave this fall.
The Institute for the Study of War likewise assessed that Putin will likely wait until after the September parliamentary elections before announcing another unpopular mobilization, while continuing to signal that Russia intends to pursue its maximalist military objectives rather than freeze the conflict.
For Western policymakers, the convergence of increasingly aggressive Kremlin rhetoric, legal preparations for mobilization, expansion of reserve forces, and growing North Korean military involvement suggests Moscow may be preparing for a substantially larger phase of the war heading into late 2026.
Whether those preparations culminate in a nationwide mobilization or an expanded offensive remains uncertain.
But together, analysts say, the signals point toward escalation—not negotiation—as the Kremlin’s current strategic direction.

